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Abstract
When covering the policymaking process, the media typically cover both
substantive aspects of the issue at hand and the political wrangling that occurs as
lawmakers attempt to agree on a course of action. In this paper, we use the recent
health care debate to investigate the effects of what we call ‘policy’ and ‘process’
frames on the citizens’ perceptions that reform would benefit the nation. First, we
apply social network analysis to articles from 144 daily U.S. newspapers in order
to track the changing centrality of each type of frame in media coverage. We then
combine the results of this analysis with data from the Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll to demonstrate the effects of policy and process frames on public attitudes.
The results show that increased policy frame centrality had a positive effect on all
citizens, regardless of partisan identification or education level, although the
effect was strongest for Republicans. The effects for increased process frame
centrality were only observed for those in the middle range of education, with
partisans on both sides reacting positively, and independents having more
negative attitudes toward health reform.
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What you have to remember about health insurance polls is that people feel lots of
anxiety, and the numbers are always quicksilver. They dart hither and yon, so that
anybody who reads a poll on national health care and takes it as serious, fixed
numbers is only going to get blown away the next time you get an exchange in the
debates… Public opinion has to be shaped and formed, rather than taken as a
given.
- Prof. James Morone, Brown University Political
Scientist, on PBS NewsHour, March 8, 2010
For the past year, American politics has been dominated in large part by the debate over
health care reform. The White House, and Congressional Democrats and Republicans have
debated everything from the broad direction policy should take (e.g. a single-payer system, an
almost-wholly-private system, or a hybrid of the two) to relatively minute details such as
whether or not to levy a tax on the use of tanning salons in order to help pay for reform.
Throughout this process, citizens have stood by as silent and, at times, not-so-silent observers. In
contrast to many policy debates, in which the public is only marginally aware of happenings
inside the Beltway, about half of Americans reported following the health care debate ‘very
closely,’ while only around five percent followed it ‘not at all’ (the remainder followed it
‘somewhat closely’).1
As Prof. Morone notes in the above quote, this heightened public attention to the
policymaking process resulted in volatility in citizens’ attitudes toward health care reform. The
volatility and malleability of citizen opinion, however, is not a new phenomenon (Converse
1964; Zaller 1992). The complex, multidimensional nature of many issues, such as health care
reform creates opportunities for strategic politicians to highlight certain, aspects of policy
debates over others in an attempt to shape citizens’ understanding of and approval for reform
(Riker 1980, 1990; Jones 1994). Indeed, E. E. Schattschneider (1960, 68) once stated that “the
definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on
what the issues are because power is involved in the definition.” In this paper, we examine how
framing of health care reform in the media, particularly in terms of the balance between coverage
of substantive aspects of reform and the policymaking process itself, has influenced individuals’
attitudes toward reform. Our findings demonstrate that a greater focus on substantive coverage
led to more positive attitudes among all segments of the public – regardless of partisan
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Data on public attention to the debate is drawn from the Kaiser Health Tracking Polls used throughout this paper.
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identification or level of education – while the effects for process coverage differed depending
on where an individual stood on these two independent variables.
Media Frames and Public Opinion
This paper builds on a growing line of research that explores the ways in which different
types of media frames affect public opinion. Framing is a fundamental aspect of political
communication and debate. Politicians and parties attempt to win support for their most preferred
policies through strategically emphasizing certain aspects or dimensions of issues that provide
them an advantage over the opposition (Schattschneider 1960; Riker 1986; Edelman 2001)
(Edelman 2001; Riker 1986; Schattschneider 1960). According to Gamson and Modigliani
(1989, 143) a frame serves as a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an
unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the
controversy is about, the essence of the issue.” Previous studies suggest that the way in which an
issue is framed can produce attitude change (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Nelson and Oxley
1999). More recent research has sought to understand the psychological processes underlying
“framing effects” and the conditions under which framing effects may be enhanced or attenuated,
including individual dispositions such as values (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Lau and
Schlesinger 2005; J. N Druckman 2008), individuals’ level of education (Kinder and Sanders
1996; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Miller and Krosnick
2000), and the existence of strong, competitive frames on both sides of an issue (Chong and
James N. Druckman 2007; Sniderman and Theriault 2004).
Much of this research focuses on the distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘strategy’
frames. The former category includes a range of framing subtypes, such as focusing on
candidates’ issue positions and performance in office during electoral campaigns (e.g. Jamieson
1993; Brewer and Sigelman 2002) or on a particular set of values underlying a policy proposal
(e.g. Chong 1993; Kellstedt 2000), while the latter encompasses frames such as campaign
strategy (e.g. Jamieson 1993; Cappella and Jamieson 1996) and the ‘games’ played by politicians
during the policymaking process (e.g. Lawrence 2000). Studies have demonstrated a growing
prevalence for strategy frames since the mid-20th Century (Patterson 1993), although some argue
that there has been more substantive coverage than is typically acknowledged (Graber 2009) and
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that the balance between the two types of frames depends on the level of government and the
substantive focus of the story (Lawrence 2000).
In terms of substantive frames, numerous scholars have shown that individuals’ policy
attitudes differ depending on which core value or general policy area a proposal is linked to (e.g.
free speech vs. public safety, environment vs. economy) (Chong 1993; Nelson, Clawson, and
Oxley 1997; Kellstedt 2000; Brewer 2003; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Nelson and Oxley
1999; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). In contrast to this focus on public opinion, much of the
research into strategy frames has focused on demonstrating their role in demobilizing (Crigler,
Just, and Belt 2006; Cappella and Jamieson 1997), polarizing (Crigler, Just, and Belt 2006),
and/or evoking lower levels of trust and higher levels of cynicism and negative attitudes about
politics among citizens (de Vreese 2004, 2005; de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; Cappella and
Jamieson 1996, 1997; Valentino, Buhr, and Beckmann 2001).
In addition to looking at whether substantive and strategy frames influence the public,
many of these studies have also taken into account the possibility that the presence or magnitude
of these effects depends on other factors, such as political predispositions and political
knowledge and sophistication. In doing so, this research draws on Zaller (1992, 1996) and others
(e.g. Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997) who have looked at the
pervasive impact these variables have on how citizens process and use political information.
Specifically, Zaller posits that predispositions will come into play in terms of whether or not
individuals receive and accept considerations, with people more likely to seek out sources and
take in information that comes from sources with whom they share a partisan affiliation and/or
other characteristics. Additionally, Zaller argues that those ‘in the middle’ in terms of political
sophistication will be the most affected by new information, as they pay enough attention to
politics to be exposed to it (unlike those lower on the sophistication scale) but do not hold such
strong predispositions and prior opinions that the information is unlikely to have an effect (unlike
those higher on the sophistication scale).
The application of these theories has yielded mixed results in terms of research on the
effects of substantive and strategy frames. Using a lab experiment, Valentino et al. (2001) find
that both partisan identification and education level determine whether or not strategy frames
have negative effects on citizens, with those with less education and no partisan identification
strongly influenced while their more-educated and partisan peers were largely unaffected.
5

Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) show similar results – that less-sophisticated and nonpartisan
individuals are more susceptible to framing effects – in a survey experiment focusing on the
substantive framing of gun policy. On the other hand, Brewer (2003) finds an interaction for
political knowledge in terms of the effects of certain substantive frames but not others, and
Criger et al. (2006) find that strategy frames have the greatest impact on increasing cynicism for
Republicans, in contrast to Democrats or Independents.
In this paper, we attempt to shed further light on this debate over interactions with
predispositions and sophistication in addition to offering a direct test of the effects of substantive
and strategy frames. Here, we term these framing categories ‘policy’ and ‘process’ to better
reflect a policymaking (as opposed to campaign) context. Policy frames, like the substantive
frames described above, evoke ideas or concerns about the issues, problems, and potential
solutions at hand (e.g. ‘access,’ ‘underinsured’). In contrast, process frames concern the path
health care legislation took to passage and the various actors who influenced it along the way
(e.g. ‘pharmaceutical companies,’ ‘reconciliation’).
Our empirical expectations depend on the frame type. For policy frames, we expect that
periods of heightened media focus will result in polarization along party lines as citizens pick up
on elite position-taking. In contrast, prior studies give us reason to believe that a focus on process
will lead to less confidence in health care reform.
H1: Greater policy frame centrality will result in greater polarization between the
opinions of Democrats and Republicans.
H2: Greater process frame centrality will result in less-positive attitudes about health care
reform.
We also expect that the above effects will differ depending on political sophistication and
predispositions. We operationalize the former using education, following Price and Zaller’s
(1993) recommendation to use this measure when a set of general political knowledge questions
is unavailable. For predispositions, we focus on partisan identification. For both, we expect those
‘in the middle’ of the spectrum (i.e. moderate education or independent) to display the greatest
effects.

6

H3: The magnitude of the effects of both policy and process frame centrality will be
higher among citizens in the middle of the education range than among those at either
end of this spectrum.
H4: The magnitude of the effects of process frame centrality will be higher among
independents than among partisans.
In addition to testing the above hypotheses, this paper also brings a new method to the
study of political communication and public opinion: social network analysis (SNA). Social
network analysis has been increasingly applied to political questions, including various aspects
of the legislative process (Fowler 2006a, 2006b; Porter et al. 2007; Porter, Onnela, and Mucha
2009; Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2009), interest group coalitions (Box-Steffensmeier and
Christenson 2009; Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Robbins 2009), and the use of legal
precedents in Supreme Court decisions (Fowler and Jeon 2008). Although policy and process
frames are clearly not humans who interact socially in the same ways that politicians do, one can
think of them as ‘interacting’ in terms of being combined in different ways across multiple
‘events’ (here defined as newspaper articles).
By viewing media frames through a network lens, one is able to gauge their prominence
through more sophisticated means than by classifying stories as focused on one or both types of
frames or counting the number of times a particular frame appears. Specifically, in this paper we
use eigenvector centrality (described in more depth below), a measure that takes into account the
number of times a frame appears in an article with other frames, giving greater weight when
those other frames are themselves more central. As a result, we are able to measure the extent to
which a frame or a category of frames permeated the information environment and separate those
frames that appeared only in stories with a specialized focus from others that popped up in
stories on a wider range of topics.
Data and Method
In order to determine the effects of policy and process frames on public attitudes
regarding health care reform, we combine data from two sources: Lexis-Nexis and the Kaiser
Family Foundation Health Tracking Poll. The latter is a monthly (previously bimonthly) survey
that focuses on health-care issues and includes a wide range of questions related to health reform.
For this paper, we use the eight surveys currently available through the Roper Center for Public
7

Opinion Research: February 2009, April 2009, and surveys for each month from June to
November 2009. We plan to incorporate additional polls into our analysis as they become
available to the public.2
Our other data source – Lexis-Nexis – allowed us to compile an extensive database of
newspaper coverage of health care reform from February to November 2009. Specifically, we
searched a set of 144 daily, U.S., English-language newspapers that focus on general news
coverage (as opposed to industry-specific concerns).3 These newspapers represent a very large
range of market sizes, from national powerhouses such as The New York Times to Today’s
Sunbeam, a paper that serves Salem County, New Jersey, southeast of Wilmington, DE. As a
result, we are confident that our study captures the overall dynamics of media coverage rather
than being slanted in favor of Beltway elite sources. We compiled all stories in these newspapers
that had the keywords “Health Care Reform” and/or “Obama Health Care Reform” as major
terms. The searches were conducted so that we created a separate set of articles for the week
prior to each survey date. For example, the June 8 set of articles contains coverage from all
sources between June 1 and June 7. A week was selected as the time interval based on research
that demonstrates the power of the recency of considerations in shaping survey responses (Zaller
1992).
The sets of newspaper articles were then parsed into individual articles using a Perl script
and processed using the tm and sna packages in R. Before using tm (a text-mining package),
we first created a dictionary of frames that we believed would appear in coverage of health care
reform and categorizing each as either a ‘policy’ or a ‘process’ frame. Policy frames were
defined as those that captured substantive aspects of health care reform, such as ‘cost shifting’ or
‘individual mandate,’ and key policy targets (‘children’). Process frames indicate features of the
legislative process, such as particular coalitions (‘blue dogs’), strategic actions (‘town hall’), and
interest groups (‘big business’).4 Using tm, we parsed each article and matched the terms to our
frame dictionary. We then constructed affiliation matrices for each day of coverage in which
each cell indicates the frequency with which a frame appears with another frame in a newspaper
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The Kaiser Health Tracking Poll is funded by the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation and conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates International. Each poll uses a national adult sample drawn using random-digit dialing of both
landline and mobile telephone numbers.
3
A list of these publications is included in Appendix B.
4
A complete list of all 152 frames, their classifications as policy or process, and alternative wordings that were
accounted for is included in Appendix C.
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story. We recoded terms appearing multiple times within a single article as 1. Thus, the
affiliation matrix was a 152 x 152 matrix where each column and row represents the frame. This
bi-modal network representing the affiliation of a set of frames with a set of newspaper articles
on health care reform can then be analyzed using standard network analysis techniques
(Wasserman and Faust 1994).
These matrices were used by the sna package to calculate eigenvector centrality, one of
multiple measures of centrality employed in social network analysis. Eigenvector centrality is a
‘closeness’ measure; in contrast to ‘degree’ measures of centrality, closeness measures take into
account the position of the node in relation to the entire network rather than just the number of
direct ties. Specifically, eigenvector centrality weights links to globally ‘important’ nodes more
than it weights links to nodes with local prominence (Bonacich 1972; Wasserman and Faust
1994). Figure 1 provides an illustration of this concept using the frame network from February 5,
2009.5 In this network, the ‘exchange’ and ‘choice’ nodes would have the same score for degree
centrality as each is linked to one other node. However, the ‘exchange’ node would have higher
eigenvector centrality because the node it is linked to (‘single payer’) is linked to another node,
which is then linked to many other nodes, while the ‘choice’ node is linked a node (‘history’)
that is not linked to any other nodes.
[Figure 1 about here]
In the context of media content, eigenvector centrality allows us to gauge the extent to
which a frame is central not only in articles about specific aspects of health policy but in
newspaper coverage as a whole. This measure also has the advantage of taking the size of the
network into account, which allows us to control for the fact that discourse was considerably
more complex in the later months of 2009 than in February and April. Since in this paper we are
interested in comparing the effects of policy and process frames on public opinion, we average
the non-zero eigenvector centrality scores within each of the two categories for each survey day.
Thus, each Kaiser poll participant is assigned a value that reflects the average policy frame
centrality for the week prior to their survey date and a similar value for process frame centrality.
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This example was chosen due to the simplicity of the February networks; the frame networks in other months are
far more complex due to rising prominence of health reform on the national agenda.
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The first step in our empirical analysis involves looking at the dynamics of framing in
newspaper coverage as the debate progresses. We do this through descriptive statistics and an
OLS model that allows us to determine whether there are statistically significant differences in
the prominence of policy and process frames as the policy process progresses. In addition, we
provide a brief overview of the most-central specific policy and process frames in each month.
In the second stage of the analysis, we use the Kaiser surveys to investigate the effects of
these frames on public opinion. Specifically, we focus on citizens’ responses to the following
question:
Do you think the country as a whole would be (better off) or (worse off) if the
president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would
make much difference?
Kaiser does not ask a straightforward question regarding general support for or opposition to
health care reform, although it does ask such questions about particular components of health
policy (e.g. Cadillac tax, expanding coverage). As a result, the above question is the best
measure of general attitudes toward health reform. In addition, this question offers the advantage
of being asked on every survey, while the more specific questions enter and leave the poll
protocol as their prominence in the debate rises and falls. We use ordered probit analysis to
determine which factors shape responses to this question. In order to pick up the potential for
partisans to polarize in their opinions, we interact the key independent variables (the mean
eigenvector centrality of policy and process frames) with partisan identification. We also include
a number of key control variables (insurance status, education, age, income, and race) in the
model and cluster the standard errors by month to account for any systematic errors among the
polls. The most notable omission in our model is a control variable for ideology, as the Kaiser
Foundation did not consistently include a question for ideology in its polls. In order to address
the question of differential effects depending on general political sophistication, we estimate the
model once for all respondents and once each for those at a low (high school or less), moderate
(some college or technical school), or high (college graduate and above) level of education.
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Results
We begin with a descriptive look at the dynamics of process and policy frame dominance
in the health care debate. Recall that the measures used here are two averages computed for each
survey date: the mean of all non-zero eigenvector centrality scores for policy frames for
newspaper articles published in the week prior to the survey date, and the same for process
frames. Figure 2 displays boxplots of these two measures broken down by survey month. As one
would expect, policy frames dominate in February, when media coverage was focused on
President Obama’s general goals for reform rather than the politics surrounding the issue.
Indeed, the four most central frames in this time period, as shown in Figure 3, all spoke to broad
policy goals: ‘universal,’ ‘access,’ ‘uninsured,’ and ‘children.’ The balance shifted toward
process in April, primarily due to the ‘bipartisan’ frame leaping to the top of the centrality
ranking after not appearing in the top 15 in February and the related focus on ‘compromise.’ In
addition, the Kaiser survey entered the field just before the April 13 decision in the highly
contested Minnesota Senate race, which likely accounts for the high centrality for the ‘filibuster’
frame, given that Al Franken’s win gave the Democrats the 60 votes needed to invoke cloture.
In June and July, Congress was involved in bill markup and committee passage, while the
president publicly battled with Republican leaders about the appropriate role of the federal
government in health care. Throughout this phase of the debate, policy frames such as ‘single
payer’ and ‘private insurers’ were most central, although process tropes such as ‘bipartisan’ and
‘compromise’ continued to have a presence. During the August congressional recess, the
conservative challenge to direction reform was taking is seen in the emergence of frames such as
‘obamacare’ and ‘government takeover,’ and the increasing centrality of ‘choice.’ The
significant media attention to the town hall meetings held across the nation is also seen in the
high centrality of this frame in August and September. In the last three months covered by this
study (September, October, and November), policy frames barely edged out process frames in
centrality. One can see the prominence of the public option in all three months, in addition to
themes such as ‘partisan’ and ‘nonpartisan’ as Congress debates legislation.
In addition to looking at these descriptive depictions of the shifting focus of newspaper
coverage of the health care debate, we also estimated an OLS model to test whether there were
statistically significant differences in the centrality of policy and process frames in each survey
period. The results, displayed in Table 1, show that policy frames clearly dominated in February
11

(the omitted category), June, and August (although to a lesser degree in this month). In July,
October, and November, policy frames were only slightly more central than process frames; and
in September the two were basically equal in prominence. Comparing these results to Figure 2,
one can see that although the inter-quartile range (IQR) for process frames is at times wider than
the IQR for policy frames, there are typically many more outliers among the policy frames, thus
explaining why policy concerns were more central in all time periods.
[Table 1 about here.]
Building on this variation in the prominence of both policy and process frames, we use an
ordered probit model to estimate the effects of frame centrality on citizens’ perceptions that
health care reform will benefit the nation. Recall that for both policy and process frames, our
expectation is that greater centrality will lead to more polarization between Democrats and
Republicans as the competing party messages become clearer to the public. In addition, we test
for an interactive effect of education by estimating the general model three additional times: once
for those with a low level of education (high school or less), once for those in the middle of the
education spectrum (some college or technical school), and once for those with high education
(college graduate or higher). The results of all models are shown in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Starting with the first model, which includes individuals of all educational backgrounds,
policy frame centrality had a statistically significant, positive effect for citizens of all partisan
affiliations, although this effect was strongest for Republicans. In contrast, process frame
centrality only had an effect on Republicans, although once again this effect was positive,
indicating a greater sense that reform will be beneficial. The magnitude of these effects are
illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5, which display the predicted probability of a respondent
picking each response category across the entire range of mean centrality scores, broken down
by partisan identification (all other variables are set at their means, or, in the case of categorical
variables, their medians). As can be seen in the top frame of both figures, Democratic support
and opposition remained relatively stable no matter how central policy and process frames were
in media coverage. On the other hand, Republicans are much more influenced by changing
12

centrality levels, particularly in the case of policy frames, with a 0.35-point shift for both the
‘better off’ and ‘worse off’ categories between the centrality extremes.
[Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here.]
Certainly none of these results offer support for our hypothesis that partisans will polarize
when policy or process frames come to the fore in newspaper coverage. Instead, it appears that
Democrats were relatively unmoving in their attitudes toward health care reform, and
Republicans, perhaps paradoxically, moved toward more positive opinions when either policy or
process frames became more central. One explanation for this pattern is that Republicans were
simply more supportive in the early stages of the health care debate and February and April had
generally high centrality scores when compared to other months. However, the coefficients for
the Republican interaction terms for both policy and process frame centrality maintain their
direction and statistical significance even if these two months are dropped from the model.
Instead, it is likely that Republicans responded in this way because many of the events that
occurred in this period could easily be viewed as Republican victories in terms of moving health
reform in a more centrist direction, while Democrats may have been frustrated that moreprogressive options, such as a single-payer system, did not remain on the bargaining table for
long. In other words, our results indicate the challenges of discerning what one should expect
from greater policy or process centrality in terms of interactions with partisan identification,
given that the centrality of a frame such as ‘public option’ could evoke more positive attitudes
from either Republicans or Democrats depending on the actual context in which that frame is
being evoked. Although we are unable to pursue a more contextual analysis of the effects of
specific frames in this paper, we plan to do so in future analyses.
Turning back to Table 2 and looking again at the overall model, there is also an
interesting result among the control variables: insurance status has no effect on attitudes toward
health reform. Rather than basing their opinions on self-interest, citizens appear to be influenced
by political affiliations (the indicators for Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant
and in the expected directions) and demographics, with higher-income, older, and white
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individuals perceiving reform as less beneficial to the nation.6 Notably, the variable for education
is not statistically significant.
Education is a significant factor, however, in determining the effects of policy and
process frame centrality. Turning to the education-specific models in Table 2, it appears that
there is a three-way interaction among the centrality of policy frames, education level, and
partisan identification. For independents, greater policy centrality affected those at all levels of
education, although the magnitude of this effect is greatest for those in the middle category, as
expected given current understandings of the effects of political sophistication on the effects of
political information. However, the coefficients for Democrats and Republicans are relatively
equal across all levels of education. We are unable to explain this puzzling result, although it
may be due in part to the extremely high public prominence of this issue (which would lead to
greater attention from the less sophisticated than one would normally find) and the fact that what
‘health care reform’ meant concretely shifted significantly during this phase of the debate (which
would explain attitude instability among the most educated).
In contrast to the somewhat muddled results for the interaction between policy frame
centrality and education, the interaction between process frame centrality and education is in line
with our expectations. The interaction terms in Table 2 show that process frame centrality has no
effect on those at either end of the educational spectrum but has a statistically significant
influence on those with a moderate level of education. In addition, the direction of this
relationship depends on the partisan identification of the respondent. These relationships are
displayed in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8.
[Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 6 shows predicted probabilities for those with a low level of education. As
indicated by the coefficients, there are no statistically significant effects of process centrality on
this group, despite the fact that one might assume a positive effect for Republicans after looking
at the predicted probability graphs. Figure 8 offers a much clearer look at a lack of effect for
policy frame centrality. For those of all political persuasions, media coverage of political
wrangling appears to have absolutely no affect on attitudes toward health care reform. Finally,
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The findings for income and age are consistent with Gelman et al.’s (2010) analysis of public attitudes toward
health care reform.
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Figure 7 offers a look at those in the middle of the education spectrum. Notably, increased
process frame centrality has a positive effect on the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans but a
negative effect on independents, thus lending empirical support to the idea that independents are
more likely to be turned off by political wrangling.
In sum, the evidence was mixed in terms of supporting our hypotheses. Perhaps the most
important overall findings were that predispositions and sophistication proved to be key
mediating factors in determining whether and how policy and process frames impacted the
public, as proposed in H3 and H4. Democrats appeared relatively unmoved throughout the
process even with fluctuations in how the debate was framed in the media, while there was some
movement among independents and Republicans. The significance of partisan predispositions is
consistent with prior research that has emphasized the need to control for predispositions to
properly assess the nature and extent of framing effects (J. N Druckman 2008; Haider-Markel
and Joslyn 2001). Although these results need further examination, it may be that many
Democrats may have felt obligated to maintain their public support for reform regardless of
events in the public debate, while Republicans displayed positive responses to policy ‘wins’ (e.g.
dropping the public option) and independents were highly sensitive to process frames.
Our expectation about political sophistication – that those ‘in the middle’ would display
the greatest effects from changes in the information environment – found evidence in terms of
our analysis of the effects of process frames but not for policy frames. Low- and highly-educated
individuals did not appear influenced by the media prominence of the lawmaking process, most
likely because the former were not paying enough attention and the latter had opinions that were
not susceptible to the effects of non-substantive frames. Those with a moderate level of
education, in contrast, were affected in ways that were also linked to their partisan affiliations,
with Democrats and Republicans rallying behind their teams and independents turned off by
political battles. Thus, our primary hypotheses – that greater centrality for policy frames would
lead to polarization by partisanship and that greater centrality for process frames would lead to
more negative attitudes about health care reform – did not prove true across the board. Instead,
these effects appeared only for specific partisan and educational subgroups.
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Conclusion and Next Steps
Public opinion is central to the functioning of democracy. The quality of representation is
often judged by the extent to which public policy reflects citizen preferences (Erikson, Wright,
and McIver 1994; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992). While public
opinion on the issue of health care reform is rooted in many sources beyond those captured by
the frames offered by the media, the manner in which journalists portrayed this policy debate
helps explain some of the movement in public opinion among particular segments of the mass
public. Given that the prominence of particular media frames is driven in part by the actual
policy debate, it appears that at least some citizens were influenced by the substantive and
procedural themes and events that emerged during this lengthy policymaking process.
This paper focuses on the distinction between policy and process frames; however, there
are a variety of other ways in which we could use social network analysis to expand on the study
of how media framing influenced public opinion in the context of health care reform. Most
notably, we do not code our dictionary of frames in terms of their associations with the pro- or
anti-reform positions or investigate their connections to specific political actors, such as
President Obama. These factors are likely to moderate the public’s willingness to accept and use
information and exploring them may also shed light on the elite framing strategies employed in
this policy debate. Furthermore, the methods and data used in this paper allow us to track the
prominence of specific frames (e.g. ‘public option,’ ‘bipartisanship’) and link them to questions
on the Kaiser polls that pick up on public preferences about particular aspects of health reform,
in contrast to the more general attitudes explored here.
The substantive contributions of this paper are primarily to provide further evidence for
already established theories about the relationship between the media framing and public
attitudes, particularly the fact that predispositions and political sophistication play key mediating
roles. Yet we also hope that this paper has demonstrated the potential for social network analysis
to contribute to the analysis of these phenomena. By moving beyond story-level coding and
frame counts to a more complex measure of centrality, we believe that network analysis provides
a novel and valuable approach to gauging how the information environment shapes the public’s
involvement in and reactions to the policymaking process.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Network of Frames for February 5, 2009
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Figure 2. Distribution of Eigenvector Centrality Scores, by Month and Frame Type
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Figure 3. Most Central Frames in News Coverage, February-November 2009
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Table 1. Frame Eigenvector Centrality as a Function of Frame Type and Month (OLS Estimates)

Variable
Coeﬃcient
Policy Frame
0.071∗∗∗
Policy * Apr 09
-0.101∗∗∗
Policy * Jun 09
-0.031
Policy * Jul 09
-0.056∗∗
Policy * Aug 09
-0.041∗
Policy * Sep 09
-0.067∗∗∗
Policy * Oct 09
-0.050∗∗
Policy * Nov 09
-0.059∗∗∗
April 2009
0.022
June 2009
-0.026
July 2009
-0.035∗
August 2009
-0.052∗∗∗
September 2009
-0.045∗∗
October 2009
-0.048∗∗
November 2009
-0.046∗∗
Intercept
0.112∗∗∗
N
R2
F (15,3479)
Significance levels :

(Std. Err.)
(0.019)
(0.023)
(0.024)
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.021)
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.021)
(0.022)
(0.020)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.017)
3495
0.063
15.695

∗ : p<0.10

∗∗ : p<0.05

∗ ∗ ∗ : p<0.01
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Table 2. Belief that Health Care Reform will Benefit the Nation as a Function of Policy and
Process Frame Eigenvector Centrality and Partisanship (Ordered Probit Estimates)

Mean EVC - Policy
Policy EVC * Dem
Policy EVC * Rep
Mean EVC - Process
Process EVC * Dem
Process EVC * Rep
Democrat
Republican
Currently Insured
Education (Years)

All
(1)
3.229

Low Ed
(2)
2.831

Mid Ed
(3)
4.694

High Ed
(4)
2.648

(0.546)∗∗∗

(1.012)∗∗∗

(0.694)∗∗∗

(0.762)∗∗∗

-.896

0.713

-3.040

-.400

(0.768)

(1.103)

(1.726)∗

(2.070)

2.162

3.199

1.043

2.567

(0.765)∗∗∗

(1.050)∗∗∗

(1.602)

(1.324)∗

-.346

1.509

-3.013

0.088

(1.183)

(2.005)

(1.299)∗∗

(0.583)

0.649

-2.756

4.300

0.514

(0.784)

(1.832)

(0.819)∗∗∗

(2.858)

1.620

1.362

4.905

0.131

(0.493)∗∗∗

(1.309)

(1.793)∗∗∗

(0.847)

0.73

0.672

0.663

0.875

(0.14)∗∗∗

(0.258)∗∗∗

(0.251)∗∗∗

(0.167)∗∗∗

-.948

-1.042

-1.096

-.834

(0.137)∗∗∗

(0.169)∗∗∗

(0.279)∗∗∗

(0.186)∗∗∗

-.080

-.134

-.030

0.093

(0.086)

(0.084)

(0.123)

(0.142)

0.014
(0.01)

Income (Thousands)
Age (Years)
Hispanic
African American
Asian/Asian American
τ1
τ2

-.002

-.004

-.003

-.001

(0.001)∗

(0.002)∗

(0.002)∗

(0.0009)

-.003

-.005

-.004

0.00003

(0.0008)∗∗∗

(0.001)∗∗∗

(0.002)∗∗

(0.002)

0.243

0.252

0.247

0.092

(0.048)∗∗∗

(0.051)∗∗∗

(0.135)∗

(0.12)

0.287

0.293

0.148

0.443

(0.072)∗∗∗

(0.152)∗

(0.058)∗∗

(0.102)∗∗∗

0.286

-.164

0.158

0.618

(0.098)∗∗∗

(0.206)

(0.299)

(0.13)∗∗∗

-.318

-.756

-.589

-.087

(0.276)

(0.287)∗∗∗

(0.214)∗∗∗

(0.257)

0.214

-.050

-.053

0.314

(0.245)

(0.273)

(0.196)

(0.244)

2246
752.382

2018
885.208

2659
219.501

Obs.
6912
2
χ statistic
118.476
∗ : p<0.10, ∗∗ : p<0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ : p<0.01
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Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Believing Health Reform Will Make Nation Better Off as a
Factor of Policy Frame Prominence and Partisan Identification
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Believing Health Reform Will Make Nation Better Off as a
Factor of Process Frame Prominence and Partisan Identification
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Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Those with a Low Level of Education Believing Health
Reform Will Make the Nation Better Off as a Factor of Process Frame Centrality and Partisan
Identification
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Figure 7. Predicted Probability of Those with a Moderate Level of Education Believing Health
Reform Will Make the Nation Better Off as a Factor of Process Frame Centrality and Partisan
Identification
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Figure 8. Predicted Probability of Those with a High Level of Education Believing Health
Reform Will Make the Nation Better Off as a Factor of Process Frame Centrality and Partisan
Identification
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Appendix B: List of Newspapers
Advance Publications Newspapers (Includes: Ann Arbor News (Michigan), Bay City Times (Michigan),
Birmingham News, Eastern Express Times (Pennsylvania), Flint Journal (Michigan), Gloucester County Times
(New Jersey), Grand Rapids Press (Michigan), Huntsville Times (Alabama), Jersey Journal (New Jersey),
Kalamazoo Gazette (Michigan), Mobile Register (Alabama), Muskegon Chronicle (Michigan), Patriot News
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), Saginaw News (Michigan), Springfield Republican (Massachusetts), Staten Island
Advance (New York), The Oregonian, The Plain Dealer, The Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY), The Star-Ledger
(Newark, New Jersey), The Times-Picayune, Today's Sunbeam (New Jersey))
The Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana)
The Albuquerque Journal
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution
The Augusta Chronicle
The Austin American-Statesman
Bangor Daily News (Maine)
The Bismarck Tribune
The Boston Herald
The Buffalo News
The Capital (Annapolis, MD)
Capital Times (Madison, WI)
Charleston Daily Mail
The Charleston Gazette
Chattanooga Times Free Press
Chicago Daily Herald
Chicago Sun-Times
The Christian Science Monitor
The Columbian (Vancouver, WA)
The Columbus Dispatch
The Daily News of Los Angeles
Dayton Daily News
The Denver Post
Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City)
The Florida Times-Union
Fort Wayne News-Sentinel (Indiana)
Grand Rapids Press (Michigan)
Herald News (Passaic County, NJ)
The Herald-Sun
The Houston Chronicle
Idaho Falls Post Register
Intelligencer Journal/New Era (Lancaster, Pennsylvania)
Jackson Citizen Patriot
Las Vegas Review-Journal
The Ledger (Lakeland)
Lewiston Morning Tribune
MediaNews Group Pubs (Includes: Alameda Times-Star (Alameda, CA), Brattleboro Reformer (Vermont),
Connecticut Post Online, Contra Costa Times, Deming Headlight (New Mexico), El Paso Times (Texas),
Enterprise Record (Chico, California), Eureka Times-Standard (California), Fairbanks Daily News-Miner (Alaska),
Farmington Daily Times (New Mexico), Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Ontario, CA), Inside Bay Area (California),
Las Cruces Sun-News (New Mexico), Long Beach Press-Telegram (Long Beach, CA), Lowell Sun (Lowell, MA),
Marin Independent Journal (Marin, CA), Monterey County Herald (CA), Oroville Mercury Register (California),
Pasadena Star-News (Pasadena, CA), Public Opinion (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), Ruidoso News (New
Mexico), San Bernardino Sun (San Bernardino, CA), San Gabriel Valley Tribune (San Gabriel Valley, CA), San
Jose Mercury News (California), San Mateo County Times (San Mateo, CA), Sentinel & Enterprise (Fitchburg,
Massachusetts), Silver City Sun-News (New Mexico), St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota), The Alamogordo Daily
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News (New Mexico), The Argus (Fremont, CA), The Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield, Massachusetts), The Daily
Review (Hayward, CA), The Evening Sun (Hanover, PA), The Lebanon Daily News (Pennsylvania), The Oakland
Tribune (Oakland, CA), The Salt Lake Tribune, The York Dispatch (York, PA), Tri-Valley Herald (Pleasanton,
CA), Vallejo Times-Herald (California), Whittier Daily News (California))
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
The New York Post
The New York Times
News & Record (Greensboro, NC)
Newsday (New York, NY)
The Palm Beach Post
The Pantagraph
The Patriot Ledger
The Philadelphia Daily News (PA)
The Philadelphia Inquirer
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Pittsburgh Tribune Review
Portland Press Herald
The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC)
The Press Enterprise
The Providence Journal-Bulletin
The Record (Bergen County, NJ)
Richmond Times Dispatch
The Roanoke Times (Virginia)
San Antonio Express-News
San Diego Union-Tribune
The San Francisco Chronicle
The Santa Fe New Mexican
Sarasota Herald-Tribune
South Bend Tribune
The Spokesman-Review
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
St. Petersburg Times
Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN)
Star-News (Wilmington, NC)
The Tampa Tribune
Telegram & Gazette (Massachusetts)
Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA)
The Times of Trenton (New Jersey)
The Times Union (Albany, NY)
Topeka Capital-Journal
Tribune-Review
The Tulsa World
The Union Leader
USA Today
The Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA)
The Washington Post
The Washington Times
Winston-Salem Journal
Wisconsin State Journal
The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle
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Appendix C: Frame Dictionary
Key Term

Frame
Type

abortion

policy

access

policy

hyde amendment; stupak amendment; stupak compromise; abortion
amendment; federal funding of abortion
accessibility; accessible

aging population

policy

baby boomers

alcohol tax

policy

tax on alcohol; taxes on alcohol; alcohol taxes

baby killer
back to the
drawing board
bankruptcy

process

basic health plan

policy

bending the cost
curve
big business

Alternate Wordings

process

start over; kill the bill

policy

medical bills
minimal benefits; minimal coverage; catastrophic coverage; minimum
coverage; catastrophic plan; basic coverage; basic health plans

policy

cost curve; cost containment

process

corporation; business executives; ceos; ceo

bipartisan

process

bipartisanship

blue dogs

process

Britain

policy

bureaucrat

policy

blue dog; blue dog democrat
British; NHS; UK; United Kingdom; England; English; National Health
Service
bureaucrats; government bureaucrats; government bureaucrat

cadillac tax

policy

cadillac; gold plated

Canada

policy

children

policy

age 25; age 26; dependents

choice

policy

choose; limit choice

chronic conditions

policy

chronic illness; chronic condition

cigarette tax

policy

tax on cigarettes; taxes on cigarettes

Clinton

process

1992; 1993; 1994; early 90s; early 1990s; 1990s

clintoncare

process

hillarycare

competition

policy

competitive

compromise

process

concession; concede; concedes; compromises; compromised

constitutional

policy

Constitution; unconstitutional

consumer groups

process

copays
cornhusker
kickback
cost cutting

policy

cost effective

policy

cost shifting

policy

create jobs

policy

death panel
defensive
medicine

policy

co pays; copay; co pay; out of pocket; deductible; deductibles

process
policy

policy

cost saving; reining in costs; rein in costs

defensive doctor
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deficit

policy

deficit neutral

policy

delivery system
Democratic
opposition
democratic
support
deny coverage

policy

financially sound

process

opposition from democrats; dissent among democrats

process

support from democrats

policy

denied coverage

doctor
doctor patient
relationship
doctor shortage

process

AMA; American Medical Association; physician; doctors; physicians

policy

relationship between patients and doctors

policy

physician shortage; provider shortage

donut hole

policy

doughnut hole; coverage gap; medicare part d

drug costs

policy

cost of prescription drugs; generics

economic crisis

policy

economy; recession; make ends meet; making ends meet

electronic records

policy

electronic medical records; emr; health information technologies

emergency room

policy

ER; emergency department

employer based

policy

employer provided; employer sponsored; portability

employer mandate

policy

require employers; requiring employers

Europe

policy

European

euthanasia

policy

exchange

policy

executive order

process

expand CHIP

policy

expand eligibility

policy

expand Medicaid

policy

expanding Medicaid; medicaid expansion

expand Medicare
expansion of
coverage
expensive tests

policy

Medicare expansion; expanding medicare

policy

expanding coverage; expand coverage

policy

expensive procedures; expensive treatments

fee for service

policy

doctors fees

filibuster

process

cloture; supermajority

financing

policy

paying for reform; paying for health care reform

fraud

policy

waste; compliance plan; whistleblower

freedom

policy

gang of eleven

process

gang of six

process

government run
government
takeover
grassroots

policy

Harry and Louise

process

health care costs

policy

exchanges; insurance exchange; health exchange; health care exchange; federal
exchange; state exchange
expand SCHIP; expanding CHIP; expanding SCHIP

stupak eleven; stupak 11; gang of 11
government sponsored; government administered

policy
process

grassroot; grass roots
rising costs; escalating costs; high cost of care; cost of care; cost of health care;
too expensive; sixth of American economy; sixth of US economy
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health disparity
heritage
foundation
history

policy

health disparities

process

historic; landmark

house bill

process

hr 3200; hr3200; house plan; pelosi bill; tricommittee bill; tricommittee draft

immigration

policy

immigrants; illegal immigrant; illegal immigration; illegal immigrants

incivility

process

lack of decorum; civility

income tax
individual
mandate
invincible youth

policy

liberty

policy

lifetime cap

policy

cap on benefits; lifetime limit

limit deductions
limit medicare
payments
long term care

policy

limit charitable donation deductions; limit deduction for chartiable donations

policy

limit medicare reimbursements; regional disparaties in reimbursement rates

policy

class act

malpractice

policy

standard of care; medical liability; tort reform

Massachusetts

policy

medical mistakes

policy

medicare for all

policy

medicare solvency

policy

millionaire tax

policy

Nebraska

process

nonpartisan

process

obamacare

policy

obesity

policy

partisan

process

party of no

process

pharma

process

playing politics

process

pooling risk
preexisting
condition
prevention

policy

private insurers

process

policy

require individuals; require all Americans; requiring individuals; requiring all
Americans

policy

medical errors
solvency of medicare; medicare going bankrupt

obese

pharmaceutical companies; drug company; drug companies; drug lobby;
pharmaceutical company; pharmaceutical industry; phrma

policy

preexisting; prior illness

policy

preventable; wellness; preventive; behavior modification

policy

insurance companies; private insurance

private market

policy

market; market system; marketplace

process is broken

process

public opinion

process

public option

policy

quality of care

policy

broken process
public opinion poll; polling; public support; public opposition; public protest;
public outcry; public dissent; public opinion polls
public plan; government option; government plan; government health care
plan; government health care option; national plan; national health plan; public
insurance option; public health insurance option
health care quality; quality of health care; care quality
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ration

policy

rationing; rationed

real health reform

policy

real reform

reconciliation

process

budget reconciliation

red tape

policy

paperwork

regulation
Republican
opposition
Republican
support
rescission
right to health
care
rights of the
patient
rising premiums
same insurance as
congress
security

policy

government regulation

process

opposition from Republicans; obstruction

process

support from Republicans

policy

rescinding; rescision; rescind

policy

right to care; fundamental right

policy

patients rights; privacy; patient rights

policy

policy

escalating premiums
same coverage as congress; same insurance as members of congress; same
coverage as members of congress
safety net

senate bill

process

senate plan; senate reform; baucus bill; kennedy bill

seniors

process

retirees; aarp; elderly

sgr

policy

sustainable growth rate; doctor fix; doc fix

single payer

policy

singlepayer

Slaughter solution
small business
owners
small business
subsidies

process

deem and pass; self-executing

policy

small business subsidy; small business exemption

snack food tax

policy

tax on snack foods; taxes on snack foods; tax on unhealthy snacks; taxes on
unhealthy snacks

socialized
medicine

policy

socialism; socialist

soda tax

policy

state option

policy

surcharge

policy

Switzerland

policy

tax credits

policy

taxing benefits

policy

tea party

process

town hall

process

transparency

policy

trigger

policy

unaffordable

policy

underserved

policy

ability to pay; affordable; able to pay; affordability; problems paying; problem
paying
rural

unemployment

policy

unemployed

unfunded mandate

policy

policy

process

tax on soda; taxes on soda; tax on soft drinks; taxes on soft drinks; soft drink
tax; sugar tax
opt out; opt in
Swiss
taxing health benefits
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uninsured

policy

unions

process

universal

policy

value added tax

policy

Vermont

policy

wait times

policy

you lie

process

underinsured; lost coverage; lost insurance; lost health coverage; lost health
insurance
labor union; organized labor; labor
vat
wait for non emergency; wait time
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